AUKUS and Australia's Strategic Dilemma: A Question of Governance and Alignment


The AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States represents one of the most significant military commitments in Australian history. At its core, the agreement involves Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and deepening military cooperation with the US, raising fundamental questions about Australia’s long-term strategic direction, sovereignty, and role in global governance.

The Case for Nuclear Submarines

Australian defence policy has long emphasised the importance of protecting its maritime borders and regional stability, particularly in response to rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific. The rationale behind the AUKUS deal is that nuclear-powered submarines—capable of longer deployments, higher speeds, and reduced detection—will provide a deterrent capability in an increasingly contested strategic environment.

Statements from the Australian government have repeatedly pointed to unspecified “threats from the north”, widely understood to be a reference to China’s military expansion and assertiveness in the South China Sea. These concerns align with broader US strategy, which seeks to maintain influence in the region in response to China’s growing naval power.

However, while the acquisition of nuclear submarines may align with US strategic interests, critical questions remain regarding how they fit into a coherent Australian national security strategy and whether they truly serve the country’s long-term geopolitical and economic interests.

The Absence of a Defined National Strategy

For a military framework like AUKUS to be effective, analysts argue it must be grounded in a clearly defined national strategy—one that articulates not just defence priorities but also Australia’s broader role in global governance. Yet, there is no comprehensive Australian national strategic document that integrates defence, diplomacy, trade, and global governance into a unified plan.

A robust national strategy would ideally assess Australia’s position in a changing world order and evaluate how it can maximise security and prosperity while minimising entanglement in conflicts driven by great-power competition. Some analysts argue that aligning too closely with the US military-industrial complex risks making Australia a proxy actor in regional tensions rather than an independent strategic player.

The Risks of Interoperability with the US Military

The AUKUS agreement does more than equip Australia with submarines; it significantly increases operational integration with the US military. The extent of this interoperability raises concerns that Australia could be drawn into future US-led conflicts without sufficient autonomy in decision-making.

Recent US administrations have demonstrated unpredictability in foreign policy, from abrupt troop withdrawals to shifting alliances. There is a risk that a change in US leadership—particularly one focused on “America First” policies—could leave Australia strategically vulnerable.

Furthermore, the economic burden of AUKUS is substantial. Estimates suggest that the nuclear submarine program could cost upwards of $368 billion over several decades. Some defence analysts question whether these funds could be better spent on alternative defence capabilities, such as advanced missile systems, cyber warfare, or strengthening regional alliances.

AUKUS and Global Governance: A Changing World Order

The global balance of power is shifting, with China and India emerging as dominant economic and military forces. The US, which has maintained unparalleled global influence since the mid-20th century, is now facing increasing competition in both economic and strategic domains.

Historically, the US-led global order has been defined by military dominance, economic sanctions, and diplomatic influence. However, some experts argue that a unipolar system is no longer sustainable and that a multipolar world—where power is distributed across multiple nations—may lead to greater global stability.

The question for Australia is whether its long-term security is best served by deepening its alliance with the US or by advocating for alternative models of global governance. Some experts suggest that greater investment in regional diplomacy, engagement with ASEAN, and strengthening UN frameworks could provide a more sustainable path to security.

Strategic Choices for Australia’s Future

Australia’s decision to commit to AUKUS without a comprehensive national strategic framework raises broader questions about its place in the world. Critics argue that, before making irreversible military commitments, the government should address key questions, including:

  • Is continued US global dominance sustainable, or should Australia prepare for a multipolar world?
  • Does interoperability with the US military compromise Australia’s strategic autonomy?
  • Could alternative defence investments provide better national security outcomes?
  • What diplomatic role should Australia play in shaping regional and global governance?

While AUKUS represents a historic security commitment, it also reflects a broader challenge: Australia’s need for a clearly defined, long-term strategic vision that extends beyond short-term defence considerations. Without it, defence policies risk being reactive rather than proactive, shaped more by external pressures than by a coherent national strategy.

As the global order evolves, Australia faces a critical decision: will it continue to act as a subordinate partner in US-led alliances, or will it seek a more independent role in shaping the future of global governance?

More Misalignment: Trump’s Pentagon Pick Questions AUKUS Submarine Sales Amid Taiwan Tensions

One of Donald Trump’s key nominees for the Pentagon has cast fresh doubt over the AUKUS security pact, warning that selling nuclear-powered submarines to Australia could undermine US naval readiness at a critical time.

Elbridge Colby, Trump’s nominee for undersecretary of defense for policy, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that supplying Virginia-class attack submarines to Australia under the trilateral agreement would be a “very difficult problem” for the United States. He warned that doing so could leave US submarines in the Indo-Pacific stretched too thin, potentially weakening America’s own deterrence posture in the region.

Concerns Over US Naval Capacity

While Colby reiterated that Australia was a “core ally” and backed the idea of strengthening its military capabilities, he expressed reservations about whether the US could afford to divert attack submarines from its own fleet.

“It is a great idea for [Australia] to have attack submarines,” Colby said. “But we face a very real threat of conflict in the coming years, particularly along the first island chain,” referring to the arc of islands running from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines.

He argued that US attack submarines are vital for deterring potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the event of escalating tensions over Taiwan.

“Our attack submarines … are absolutely essential for making the defence of Taiwan or otherwise a viable and practical option,” he told the committee. “If we can produce submarines in sufficient numbers and at sufficient speed, then great. But if we can’t, then supplying Australia becomes a very difficult problem because we don’t want our servicemen and women in a weaker position.”

Colby’s comments reflect growing concerns among US policymakers about the state of America’s submarine fleet, which is currently operating below its target strength and struggling with shipbuilding delays.

US Submarine Shortfall and AUKUS Commitments

The AUKUS agreement, signed in 2021, commits the US to selling Australia between three and five Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The first is due for delivery in 2032, intended to replace Australia’s ageing Collins-class diesel-electric submarines while the country develops its own nuclear-powered fleet.

However, US law requires that any submarine transfer must not diminish America’s own undersea warfare capability—a condition that defence analysts say is increasingly difficult to meet.

According to a February report from the US Congressional Research Service, the US Navy currently operates 49 attack submarines, well below its target of 66. At present, the US is only producing around 1.2 attack submarines per year, significantly short of the 2.3 required to meet both its own needs and those of Australia.

The report proposed an alternative strategy: instead of selling submarines to Australia, the US would retain additional submarines in its own fleet and deploy them to Australian waters, effectively basing American subs at Australian ports under US command.

“Up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be built,” the report suggested. “Instead of three to five of them being sold to Australia, these boats would remain in US Navy service and operate out of Australia alongside the five US and UK submarines already planned to be deployed there.”

US Pressures Australia to Boost Defence Spending

Colby also used his Senate testimony to urge Australia to increase its defence spending, arguing that Canberra was not investing enough to match the growing security threats in the region.

“The main concern the United States should press with Australia, consistent with the president’s approach, is higher defence spending,” Colby wrote in a submission to the committee.

He cited NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s call for members to raise defence budgets to 3% of GDP, arguing that Australia should match or exceed this level given the scale of the challenge posed by China.

Australia’s current defence spending is budgeted at $56 billion this year (2.02% of GDP). The Albanese government has pledged to increase this to over $100 billion by 2033-34 (2.4% of GDP), but Colby suggested this was still insufficient given regional threats.

Australia’s Defence Minister, Richard Marles, defended the government’s commitment, stating that defence investment was already at record levels.

Trump’s Push to Revive US Shipbuilding

Trump has previously indicated that he intends to boost US naval production, addressing concerns over the slow pace of submarine construction. In a recent address to Congress, he pledged to create a new “Office of Shipbuilding” within the White House to accelerate production.

“We’re going to make them very fast, very soon,” Trump said.

The AUKUS deal remains one of Australia’s largest-ever military investments, but as US officials continue to debate whether America can afford to divert submarines to its allies, questions remain over whether the promised Virginia-class boats will ever be delivered to Australia at all.

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