When the AUKUS pact was unveiled in 2021, it was sold as a revolutionary strategic partnership—one that would cement Australia’s role in the Indo-Pacific security architecture and deliver a fleet of next-generation nuclear-powered submarines. Today, nearly four years on, that promise is mired in industrial delays, ballooning costs, and a deepening national debate about sovereignty, risk, and Australia's entanglement in U.S. and U.K. strategic ambitions.
With the benefit of hindsight, and fresh figures from the United Kingdom’s submarine yards, it is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that Australia will see a domestically built SSN-AUKUS submarine before 2050. The entire agreement, once promoted as a strategic leap into the future, now risks becoming a historical cautionary tale.
A Submarine Fleet on Paper
The centrepiece of AUKUS, the SSN-AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine, is to be co-designed by the United Kingdom and built by BAE Systems at Barrow-in-Furness, with later vessels assembled in Adelaide. But BAE’s performance on Britain’s Astute-class submarines offers little optimism.
Each Astute-class boat has taken, on average, 128 month, i.e. more than 10 years, to complete. HMS Ambush, the fastest of the fleet, still required over nine years from keel to commission. As of mid-2025, there are two boats yet to be delivered, and full-scale production of the Dreadnought-class nuclear ballistic submarines (also built by BAE) will soon dominate the shipyard’s resources.
According to projections based on current output, it would take 39 years and two months to build the UK’s full SSN-A fleet, let alone Australia’s. With the SSN-AUKUS boats scheduled after the Dreadnought program, the timeline now stretches deep into the 2050s, potentially leaving Australia without a single domestically produced nuclear submarine before mid-century.
A Reactor That Doesn’t Exist Yet
Further compounding the problem is the nuclear heart of the submarines: the Rolls-Royce PWR-3 reactor. This propulsion unit, shared by both the SSN-AUKUS and Dreadnought-class submarines, remains trapped in a protracted development cycle.
Rolls-Royce’s Core Production Capability (CPC) project in Derby, which is responsible for building the reactors, has been delayed by more than five years. The UK’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority has repeatedly listed the CPC as “red,” signalling that the project’s successful delivery “appears to be unachievable.” This alone casts serious doubt over whether Australia’s SSN-AUKUS boats can be delivered within any credible timeframe.
A Political Project Built on Shaky Foundations
AUKUS was conceived as a geopolitical masterstroke but risks devolving into an industrial quagmire. Critics note that BAE Systems, the lead contractor, brings a trail of corruption scandals, procurement controversies, and manufacturing delays. In the UK, BAE’s cost overruns on naval shipbuilding programs have angered ministers. In Australia, the same company was at the centre of the Hunter-class frigate debacle, a program plagued by budget blowouts and a now decades-long delay in delivery.
The irony is hard to miss: Australia’s nuclear submarine future rests in the hands of a company currently delivering ships years late, to both the UK and Australian navies, in the very shipyards now meant to launch the AUKUS fleet.
The Sovereignty Trade-Off
Amid these delays, a more profound question looms: what is Australia sacrificing in exchange for an uncertain fleet of submarines?
Under AUKUS, Australia will acquire at least three and up to five second-hand Virginia-class submarines from the United States starting in the 2030s. But with the U.S. Navy struggling to maintain its own Virginia-class production targets, now averaging fewer than two boats a year, well below required levels, there is growing scepticism that even this interim promise can be fulfilled.
In the meantime, Australia has already transferred over half a billion dollars to the U.S. industrial base to "shore up" production lines, while committing to host a rotating presence of American nuclear subs under "Submarine Rotational Force – West" in Perth.
Such moves, coupled with Defence Minister Richard Marles’ assertions that Australia must become "interchangeable" with the U.S. military, have ignited domestic debate. As former Australian diplomat Allan Behm noted, “If the definition of sovereignty is the capacity to say no, then AUKUS makes that increasingly difficult.”
The China Factor
Proponents of AUKUS often cite China’s rising military assertiveness as justification. However, Australia's existing defence doctrine of a layered, sovereign “Defence of Australia” posture is being eclipsed by forward-leaning strategies that mirror U.S. Indo-Pacific planning, particularly in the Taiwan Strait.
Yet China, while expanding its influence, has shown no concrete desire to invade Australia. As Paul Keating famously observed, “China is not a threat to Australia unless we decide to make it one.” Nevertheless, Australian ships now routinely operate in the South and East China Seas under U.S.-led operations, often in direct friction with Beijing.
What’s the Alternative?
Australia’s own defence experts - including former Navy Chief Chris Barrie - have called for a rethink. Barrie argues that diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion, coupled with autonomous undersea drones and long-range missiles, offer faster, cheaper, and more independent defence capabilities.
Ukraine's success in using drones to sink Russian ships has underscored how small, agile technologies can reshape maritime conflict. As Australia commits hundreds of billions to submarines it may not see for 25 years, many are questioning whether a more flexible, homegrown solution has been ignored in pursuit of political symbolism.
Conclusion: AUKUS at a Crossroads
AUKUS was meant to be a bold leap forward. But it is increasingly defined by long timelines, uncertain deliveries, and strategic dependencies that threaten to erode Australia's defence sovereignty.
The deeper Australia invests in AUKUS, the more it ties itself to defence contractors with poor delivery records and to allies with their own strategic interests. If BAE’s current pace holds and Rolls-Royce’s delays persist, it is not unthinkable that Australia’s first SSN-AUKUS submarine could surface after 2050 - if it surfaces at all.
For a project designed to ensure security, AUKUS is creating uncertainty. And for a nation seeking sovereignty, it may be trading independence for illusion.
Sources:
UK Infrastructure and Projects Authority Reports (2024),
UK Ministry of Defence Astute and Dreadnought program updates,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),
Lowy Institute,
The Guardian (July 2025),
Australian National Audit Office reports on BAE Systems and Department of Defence.
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