What has Australia actually bought via AUKUS?

A recent report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) has proposed a new arrangement for the AUKUS partnership, in which the United States would maintain control over all nuclear submarines. Under this arrangement, Australia would focus on other military missions, such as developing its own conventional submarine fleet. See https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418

The CRS report argues that this arrangement would be more feasible than the current plan, which calls for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines from the United States. The report notes that the US Navy does not have enough submarines to meet its own needs, and that it would be difficult to transfer enough submarines to Australia by 2032, as the AUKUS agreement currently stipulates.

The CRS report also argues that this arrangement would be more cost-effective for Australia. The cost of acquiring and operating nuclear submarines is very high, and Australia would likely have to spend billions of dollars on infrastructure and training to support a nuclear submarine fleet. By focusing on other military missions, Australia could save money and focus on its own security priorities.

The CRS report's proposal has been met with mixed reactions. Some experts believe that it is a viable option that would allow Australia to maintain its security partnership with the United States without overextending itself financially. Others argue that it would weaken Australia's military capabilities and make it more reliant on the United States.

The future of the AUKUS partnership is uncertain. The CRS report's proposal is just one of many options that are being considered, and it is unclear whether it will be adopted. However, the report's findings highlight the challenges that Australia faces in acquiring nuclear submarines, and they suggest that a new arrangement may be necessary.

The CRS report's proposal is based on the assumption that the United States and Australia will continue to cooperate closely on security matters. However, there is no guarantee that this will be the case in the future.

The CRS report does not address the issue of how Australia would acquire the expertise and technology needed to operate nuclear submarines. This could be a major obstacle to implementing the proposal.

The CRS also canvasses the potential impact on the deterrence of China should Australia and the US operate separately. “A newly created force of Australian nuclear submarines would present China with a second allied decision-making centre (along with the United States) for operations in the Indo-Pacific, which would enhance deterrence of potential Chinese aggression by complicating Chinese military planning,” it suggests as a “pro” argument. The argument against that, though, was that it could weaken deterrence against China. This would be the case “if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that Australia might use the transferred Virginia-class boats less effectively than the US Navy would use them if the boats were retained in US Navy service,” the report said.