AUKUS Under Strain: Australia’s Submarine Gamble Faces Strategic, Political, and Industrial Realities

What began as a fanfare of strategic reinvention — a historic trilateral pact between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom — is now increasingly mired in uncertainty, legislative gridlock, and sobering arithmetic. The AUKUS agreement, particularly its flagship promise to equip Australia with a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, is faltering under the weight of its own ambition.

First unveiled in September 2021 under the Biden administration, AUKUS was hailed as a transformative defence alliance that would secure Australia’s position as a key Indo-Pacific power and deepen integration with its Anglosphere allies. But in the three years since, what was touted as a “game-changer” has begun to resemble a cautionary tale of political overreach, industrial overstretch, and strategic miscalculation.

A Billion-Dollar Mirage?

Australia’s commitment to AUKUS, with a projected cost of A$368 billion (US$239 billion), represents one of the most expensive defence acquisitions in its history. That figure, however, is more than a mere budget line — it is a generational wager on American and British shipbuilding timelines, defence doctrine consistency, and political stability.

From the outset, concerns about the feasibility of the plan were buried under layers of diplomatic enthusiasm. The timeline for delivery — with the first US Virginia-class submarines expected in the early 2030s and a new UK-Australia-designed class (SSN-AUKUS) emerging in the 2040s — stretches so far into the future that even defence planners struggle to frame it in present-day relevance. Meanwhile, the operating environment in the Indo-Pacific, particularly vis-à-vis China, is evolving on a much shorter time horizon.

Congressional Crossroads

What few in Canberra seemed willing to confront was the fact that the United States Congress, not the White House, holds the final word on the transfer of American submarines. A May 2023 report from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) should have been a red flag. It outlined the multiple layers of conditionality that must be met before any vessels can be transferred, including an assurance that doing so would not degrade the U.S. Navy’s undersea capabilities.

The legislative package submitted to Congress under the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes authorisation to sell up to two Virginia-class submarines to Australia — but only under strict conditions. These include guarantees of cost recovery, offsetting construction orders for the U.S. Navy, and substantial Australian investment in the American industrial base.

Senator Roger Wicker of Mississippi, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, has made no secret of his reservations. “The AUKUS plan,” he said, “would transfer US Virginia-class submarines to a partner nation even before we have met our own Navy’s requirements.” With the U.S. submarine production rate hovering around 1.2 boats per year — below the Navy’s stated need of 2.3 — the prospect of sharing existing inventory is more controversial than ever.

A Strategic Gap Measured in Decades

To proponents of AUKUS, such concerns are manageable details within a long-term strategic vision. But critics, including some within the Pentagon, argue that the timeline itself undermines the pact’s strategic coherence.

Eldridge Colby, a former Trump-era Pentagon official and influential voice in defence circles, has pointedly questioned the utility of AUKUS given its protracted timelines. “This is a program that will yield results in 10, 15, 20 years,” he warned. “But the real window of danger in the Indo-Pacific is now — this decade.” In a region where security challenges evolve in months, not decades, the delay risks rendering the entire agreement strategically obsolete before it ever becomes operational.

Domestic Delusions and International Dependence

In Canberra, the announcement of AUKUS was met with bipartisan celebration. Successive governments portrayed it as evidence of Australia’s newfound seriousness in regional defence, and a bold pivot toward nuclear propulsion — despite the country having no civil nuclear industry, limited expertise in nuclear maintenance, and a patchy industrial base for building advanced submarines.

Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, who had previously scrapped a similar submarine deal with France in favour of more realistic timelines, has offered a withering assessment. “This deal was always structured in a way that allows the U.S. to walk away at any moment,” he noted. “The transfer of submarines is highly conditional, and Australia’s leverage is almost nonexistent.”

That conditionality is codified in U.S. law. Before any transfer, the President must certify to Congress that the sale will not compromise U.S. undersea capabilities, aligns with national interests, and advances AUKUS. Australia must also demonstrate that it can fund and support expanded shipbuilding capacity — not just domestically, but in U.S. shipyards.

The Trump Factor

With the U.S. political landscape shifting, AUKUS faces an additional stress test. Donald Trump, who is leading in multiple polls for the 2024 presidential election, has made clear that “America First” remains his guiding doctrine. His administration has initiated a review of AUKUS commitments — a process Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles optimistically described as “a natural part of any new government’s due diligence.”

But Trump-era officials like Colby are not bound by the institutional momentum that underpinned AUKUS under Biden. Their calculus is hard-nosed: American capacity first, allies second. Australia’s role as a reliable partner may matter diplomatically, but not if it dilutes American military readiness.

AUKUS: Agreement or Illusion?

Beneath the political theatre and diplomatic formalities lies a sobering question: what if AUKUS, at least in its current form, is never fully implemented?

The structural obstacles are formidable. Industrial capacity, particularly in submarine construction, is already stretched thin. The geopolitical assumptions underpinning the agreement are increasingly unstable. And the financial and operational burdens for Australia are mounting, with few assurances of return.

AUKUS was conceived as a strategic leap forward — but it may yet become a monument to strategic overreach. For Australia, the challenge now is not only to secure submarines, but to salvage credibility from a deal that has exposed the limits of middle-power agency in an era of great power recalibration.

The submarines, if they come at all, will be years away. But the bill is due now. And the allies who offered the deal are not bound by sentiment — only by their interests.