The Death of International Law: How It Benefits the Weapons Industry

 


1. Legal Foundations Under Siege

1.1 ICJ Genocide Case and Provisional Measures

On 26 January 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) granted six provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel, finding a “plausible risk of genocide” under the 1948 Genocide Convention. These included obligations to prevent genocidal acts, enable humanitarian access, and preserve evidence (ICJ, 2024). Subsequent orders in March and May 2024 reinforced these measures, specifically ordering the cessation of operations in Rafah.

Israel has not complied with these rulings. The ICJ’s final judgment is deferred until at least 2027, delaying enforceable accountability (The Guardian, July 2025).

1.2 ICJ Advisory Opinion: The Occupation Itself is Illegal

On 19 July 2024, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion declaring Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories unlawful (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2024). The Court held:

  • Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) is illegal.

  • Israel must end the occupation “as rapidly as possible.”

  • All states have an obligation not to recognize the occupation as legal and not to render aid or assistance that would maintain it.

This finding compounds the genocide proceedings by underscoring that the occupation itself - not just its methods - is incompatible with international law. Yet enforcement is absent, as geopolitical alliances override legal determinations.

1.3 ICC Warrants and Political Retaliation

On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, alleging war crimes including starvation as a method of warfare and persecution of civilians (ICC, 2024).

The United States responded by threatening sanctions against ICC personnel under the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act and Executive Order 14203, echoing earlier actions during ICC investigations into Afghanistan and Palestine (JURIST, 2025).

2. Enforcement Gaps: Why Gaza Has No Peacekeeping Forces

The absence of UN peacekeeping forces in Gaza, despite precedent in the Bosnian crisis (1990s) and DRC vs Rwanda (2000s), is not a legal impossibility but a political impossibility.

  • Security Council Vetoes: The deployment of peacekeeping forces requires a Security Council mandate. In Gaza, the U.S. has vetoed or signalled opposition to any resolution that could authorize such a mission, citing Israel’s “right to self-defence” (UNSC Records, 2024–2025).

  • Host State Consent: Peacekeeping forces typically require consent of the primary parties. Israel, exercising control over entry points and borders, has made clear it will not consent to UN forces in Gaza.

  • Operational Risk & Mandate Politics: Unlike Bosnia or the DRC, where consensus, however fragile, emerged to deploy forces, Gaza is entangled in the politics of a close Western ally. This fundamentally alters the political calculus for troop-contributing countries.

The absence of peacekeepers highlights the selective application of UN enforcement mechanisms, reinforcing the perception of double standards.




3. The Breakdown of Enforcement and Normative Deterrence

The dual findings that genocide is plausible and that the occupation itself is illegal would, in a neutral system, demand immediate enforcement. Instead:

  • Powerful states actively block enforcement (e.g., U.S. vetoes, EU hesitancy to impose meaningful sanctions).

  • Peacekeeping mechanisms are selectively withheld where they would challenge geopolitical allies.

  • The deterrent value of law erodes, signalling to other states that violations carry minimal risk if shielded by power.

4. The Weapons Industry: Structural Beneficiary

This legal paralysis directly benefits the global arms industry:

4.1 Persistent Conflict = Sustained Demand

Wars without enforcement drag on. The Gaza war has driven massive transfers of precision munitions, drones, and surveillance systems.

  • U.S. package to Israel (Feb 2025): $2.5 billion in bombs, artillery shells, and other ordnance, approved during ongoing ICJ and ICC proceedings (U.S. DoD, 2025).

4.2 Immunity for Suppliers

Arms companies remain insulated:

  • Lockheed Martin, Boeing, RTX, BAE Systems have all seen spikes in revenue linked to Gaza operations.

  • ICC or domestic liability for suppliers is politically neutralized by shielding states.

4.3 Precedent Expands Markets

Unchecked urban bombardment in Gaza sets operational precedent for future conflicts, prompting states to acquire weapons optimized for similar campaigns.

5. Feedback Loop: Law’s Death, Arms’ Growth

The cycle continues:

  1. Law is ignored (occupation illegal; genocide plausible; no peacekeepers).

  2. Conflict escalates.

  3. Weapons demand surges.

  4. Arms industry profits.

  5. Powerful states protect conditions for continued demand.

 6. Pathways to Recovery - And Resistance from Industry

To reverse this spiral:

  • Security Council reform: limit the veto in atrocity cases, expand membership to reflect contemporary geopolitics.

  • ICC protection: reform domestic and international norms to insulate prosecutors and judges from political retaliation.

  • Universal jurisdiction: much like Spain’s Pinochet precedent, more states must legislate war crimes accountability across borders.

  • Stronger arms export controls: automatic suspensions upon credible atrocity findings, with penalties for non‑compliance.

These reforms directly threaten profit models of major arms firms and the states whose influence sustains them, hence the fierce resistance to legal enforcement.

Conclusion: The Occupation Ruling as a Tipping Point

The July 19, 2024 ICJ opinion that the occupation is illegal is a critical moment not just for Palestine but for the credibility of international law. Failure to act on such a categorical finding demonstrates that law, without enforcement, is rhetoric.

The absence of peacekeepers in Gaza, despite the precedent of Bosnia and the DRC, exposes the naked political selectivity of UN enforcement mechanisms. In this environment, the weapons industry thrives, not because it orchestrates the collapse of law, but because it operates most profitably where law is weakest.

International law is not merely symbolic—it is essential to constraining power and preventing mass violence. Its current collapse in the Gaza conflict has exposed geopolitical double standards and empowered an entire economic sector: the weapons industry. If ICJ findings and ICC warrants go unimplemented, law disintegrates into diplomatic rhetoric. Meanwhile, weapon producers and their state patrons reap the material benefits of conflict, creating perverse incentives for sustaining legal impunity. The future of global justice and global peace now depends on whether legal institutions can be re‑empowered before they are irretrievably hollowed out.

If international law cannot enforce its rulings in the face of clear illegality, then the post‑1945 legal order is functionally dead—and the economics of perpetual war will continue to dominate the geopolitics of the 21st century.

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