The Albanese government has formally recognised the state of Palestine. Yet this symbolic shift is not enough for many human rights groups and political voices who are calling for concrete measures to reduce the human toll in Gaza. Among them, the Greens have demanded that Canberra suspend its role in the F-35 fighter jet program, a global supply chain that Israel can access, and to impose targeted sanctions on senior figures in the Netanyahu government.
The federal government rejects suggestions that Australia is sending weapons to Israel and has labelled such claims “misinformation.” The debate centres on whether Australian-made components for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter indirectly contribute to Israeli air operations over Gaza.
Israel’s Use of F-35s
Israel’s military has acknowledged using its F-35 fleet to carry out “close proximity strikes” and hit “terror targets” in support of ground troops. Legal challenges in Europe have already linked the jets to civilian casualties. In 2023, a Dutch appeals court concluded there was a clear risk that F-35s were being used in attacks on Gaza and that parts exported from the Netherlands were contributing to serious violations of international humanitarian law. Danish reporting has also connected the aircraft to a missile strike in southern Gaza that killed 90 people.
Palestinian human rights group Al-Haq has told a UK court that F-35s have played a central role in strikes which have killed hundreds of civilians, including many children.
Australia’s Role in the Supply Chain
According to the Department of Defence, more than 75 Australian companies contribute to the global F-35 program. In Victoria alone, more than 700 critical components are produced. RUAG Australia is the sole global supplier of the F-35’s “uplock actuator system,” a key mechanism enabling the aircraft to fire weapons while maintaining stealth. Australia also hosts a regional parts distribution hub.
Since joining the program, Australian companies have earned about $5 billion in contracts, a small share of a project that the US Government Accountability Office estimates will cost more than $2 trillion over its lifetime.
How the Supply Works
Lockheed Martin coordinates the supply chain from the United States. Participating companies manufacture parts in bulk for all customer nations, rather than for individual states such as Israel. The jet is flown by the US and 19 allied nations, including the UK, Japan, and Germany.
In July, the investigative site Declassified reported that parts described in shipping records as being for the F-35 were sent from Sydney to Tel Aviv. The Australian government insists there is no direct supply arrangement with Israel. Officials say no weapons or ammunition have been exported to Israel since before the current conflict and not for at least five years.
Potential Leverage and Risks
Some analysts believe Australia could create disruption in the program if it refused to supply certain components, particularly those for which local firms are the sole global manufacturer. Kelsey Gallagher, a senior researcher at Project Ploughshares, notes that replacing such suppliers would be difficult due to national security restrictions on sourcing from non-allied states.
However, withholding parts could trigger contractual disputes. Lockheed Martin has previously sued suppliers for failing to deliver on time, and penalties for delays could be passed down the chain.
International Precedents
No state has withdrawn from the F-35 supply network, but several have curtailed other military exports to Israel. Germany has halted deliveries of materials that could be used in Gaza operations. The UK has suspended most relevant arms export licences, although it carved out an exemption for the F-35 program, citing NATO security needs and the war in Ukraine.
The Legal and Moral Arguments
Under the Arms Trade Treaty, supplying weapons that are later used to commit war crimes can expose governments to criminal liability. The International Court of Justice has deemed the genocide claim against Israel in Gaza “plausible.” Greens senator David Shoebridge argues that components for military aircraft constitute weapons under international law, making Australia complicit.
International law expert Donald Rothwell from the Australian National University takes a more cautious view, noting the difficulty in proving intent or direct use. Yet he acknowledges that exports of weapon-specific components destined for the Israeli Defence Force would materially aid its campaign.
Former US State Department official Josh Paul, who resigned in protest over arms shipments to Israel, describes Australia’s ongoing role as “direct facilitation of war crimes.” The UK government has itself admitted in court that its supply of F-35 components for possible use in Israel breached its own export control laws.
Human Rights Concerns
The Australian Centre for International Justice says the country’s involvement “raises grave concerns” about complicity in atrocities. Amnesty International Australia warns that the lack of transparency around defence exports makes it almost impossible to assess the scale of involvement in potential war crimes. Human Rights Watch is among hundreds of civil society organisations urging an immediate halt to all arms transfers to Israel.
Canberra’s Position
Defence Minister Richard Marles maintains that Australia does not export weapons to Israel and insists the F-35 arrangement is a long-standing multilateral program run through the US. Foreign Minister Penny Wong has similarly described Australia’s role as supplying “non-lethal” parts.
For critics, that distinction misses the point. As the humanitarian crisis in Gaza deepens, the question for Australia is whether continuing to supply critical military components – however indirectly – undermines both its commitment to international law and its moral standing.
Australia’s F-35 supply chain at a glance
This quick guide maps key Australian firms contributing to the Joint Strike Fighter program, what they make or maintain, and whether those items are uniquely sourced from Australia. It focuses on the parts most often cited by defence agencies, courts, and industry disclosures. Where “sole-source” is noted, that means the company is widely reported as the only approved global supplier of that specific item.
How the chain fits together
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Australia’s firms feed parts into a US-led tiered system coordinated by Lockheed Martin. Components are pooled for all customer nations rather than earmarked for a specific country.
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Several Australian items are hard to substitute quickly due to qualification, security and tooling bottlenecks. These include the uplock actuators, certain weapons adapters, and the global engine trailer.
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Sustainment matters as much as new build. TAE’s F135 engine depot status in Queensland gives Australia a regional maintenance role that affects availability rates across the Indo-Pacific fleet.
Why “sole-source” matters
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When an item has only one qualified supplier worldwide, any pause or restriction can create near-term disruption to deliveries or repairs. That leverage is magnified if the part affects weapons integration or engine availability.
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Contract terms typically penalize delays through liquidated damages or pass-through penalties from prime contractors. Governments weigh those risks alongside legal, humanitarian and foreign policy obligations.
Transparency gaps to watch
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Many subcontracts are commercially confidential, which obscures the exact volumes and destinations of parts once they enter the pooled system.
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Australia hosts a regional parts distribution hub for the F-35, which supports multiple operators. Public reporting rarely separates what is shipped for training, operational use or depot spares.
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