Selective Sovereignty: Why Australia Sanctions Russia and Iran but Not Israel

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Introduction: A Stark Policy Divide

In recent years, Australia has demonstrated boldness in applying sanctions against foreign actors violating international norms. More than 1,500 targeted sanctions have been levelled against Russian individuals and entities following the invasion of Ukraine. Iran has faced diplomatic rebuke and sanctions over human rights abuses and foreign interference, including the unprecedented expulsion of its ambassador in August 2025 following ASIO-confirmed sabotage plots.

Yet Australia has imposed no such punitive measures against Israel, despite:

  • Over 63,000 deaths in Gaza, including 61,805 Palestinians reported killed as of 30 July 2025 (according to the Gaza Health Ministry and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs),

  • The deaths of 217 journalists and media workers, 120 academics, and more than 224 humanitarian aid workers, including 179 UNRWA employees,

  • UN-recognised violations of international humanitarian law, and

  • Arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant.

Scholars estimate that 80 percent of Palestinians killed have been civilians.
This asymmetry is not simply an oversight. It reflects a deeper, entangled logic, rooted in geopolitical alignment, domestic political caution, and most significantly, defence-industrial interdependence.

Defence-Industrial Entanglement: Quiet Architecture of Impunity

Australia is a Tier 3 industrial partner in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, the single largest military project in history. More than 70 Australian companies supply components for the F-35, including critical electronics, composites, and mechanical parts. These components are funnelled into aircraft sold globally, including to Israel, which deploys the F-35I Adir variant in its operations over Gaza and the West Bank.

Who profits?

  • Australian firms such as Quickstep Holdings, Marand, and Ferra Engineering have secured long-term contracts to manufacture parts for the F-35 supply chain.

  • These companies, and the investors behind them, benefit directly from each F-35 delivered, including those sold to the Israeli Air Force.

  • In 2023–24, Australian defence exports grew to 6.7 billion dollars, much of it underpinned by U.S.-led programs like the F-35.

Critically, Australia is not just exporting weapons to Israel. It is co-producing them. This structural entanglement makes it diplomatically and economically complex to sanction Israeli operations without indirectly harming the domestic defence sector and its profit flows.

Legal vs. moral accountability

While Germany has halted arms shipments to Israel citing legal obligations under the ICJ’s genocide proceedings, Australia argues its role is "indirect" and therefore outside legal scrutiny. But this is a political choice, not a legal necessity. A government serious about upholding international law could legislate arms embargoes or investment screening tools to ensure no components flow to parties credibly accused of war crimes.

Strategic Alignment and the U.S. Umbrella

Australia's military posture is tightly bound to the United States. This includes:

  • Participation in AUKUS, the nuclear-powered submarine pact currently under intense renegotiation,

  • Hosting of U.S. military assets and rotational forces,

  • Intelligence cooperation via the Five Eyes alliance,

  • Political alignment on Indo-Pacific deterrence, especially against China.

The United States has consistently used its veto to shield Israel from UN resolutions. Australia’s reluctance to break ranks, even as Canada, the UK, France, and others diverge, reflects the geostrategic price of dependence.

Any decisive action against Israel, such as ending component supply, halting training missions, or freezing military contracts, would risk rupturing defence ties with Washington and threatening AUKUS viability. The Albanese government, already under U.S. pressure to increase defence spending and commit to supporting U.S. action in a Taiwan conflict, appears unwilling to add tension over Gaza.

Public Pressure and Political Hesitation

Public sentiment is shifting. Mass rallies in Australia have condemned the Gaza offensive, and former senior officials, including ex-Foreign Minister Bob Carr, have publicly urged the government to impose sanctions on Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu. Carr has also reignited debate over the influence of pro-Israel lobbying groups on Australian politics.

Yet even as public support grows for Palestinian rights and global condemnation escalates, the government's response remains rhetorically cautious and substantively restrained. It has opted for diplomatic statements over sanctions, and recognition over reparation.

Conclusion: The Cost of Inconsistency

Australia’s foreign policy shows it is willing to act decisively when adversaries flout the rules, unless those adversaries are powerful allies, embedded in defence-industrial frameworks, or shielded by economic entanglements.

This inconsistency undermines the very principles Australia claims to uphold: rule of law, multilateralism, and human rights. It reveals a troubling trend in global politics, where moral clarity is inversely proportional to economic exposure.

If Canberra truly wishes to lead as a principled middle power, it must re-evaluate its complicity in global military supply chains and its selective invocation of accountability. Failing to do so risks reinforcing a world where rules are only enforced when convenient and where justice is contingent on the balance sheet.

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