Secret Cargo: Australia’s Covert F‑35 Supply to Israel

 

Recent leaks have laid bare a hidden dimension of Australia’s involvement in the war in Gaza — namely, the direct shipment of F‑35 fighter‑jet parts from Australia to Israel via commercial passenger flights. These revelations demand scrutiny from legal, geopolitical, and ethical perspectives.

The Leaked Evidence

Documents obtained by Declassified Australia reveal that between October 2023 and September 2025, at least 68 shipments of F‑35 parts were flown from Australia to Israel over commercial passenger planes. 

A cluster of 51 records identifies the final destination as Nevatim Airbase (Negev desert), home to Israel’s F‑35 squadrons. 

One recent shipment in mid‑September 2025 carried a component labelled “Inlet Lube Plate,” described in the documents as “Military Goods – Aircraft parts,” with the trading partner listed as Lockheed Martin. 

These shipments bypass the usual F‑35 logistics hubs in the United States and the Netherlands, instead routing via Sydney and commercial passenger routes, e.g. Thai Airways TG472 to Bangkok, then onward to Israel via El Al. 

In parallel, in October 2025, Declassified Australia published its “Secret Cargo” exposé detailing this covert pipeline. 

The Government’s Position and Denials

Australia’s government has repeatedly denied that it exports weapons or parts to Israel since the Hamas–Israel conflict began. In Parliament, ministers have claimed that any F‑35 components from Australia are non‑lethal, and that they feed into a global supply chain managed by Lockheed Martin, not direct bilateral transfers. 

Defence officials, when pressed in Senate estimates, have distanced themselves from the shipments, asserting the parts remain U.S. property and that allocation is managed centrally by Lockheed Martin. 

Meanwhile, archival traces of Australia’s own F‑35 industry web pages containing details about Australian companies’ contributions to aircraft parts have quietly disappeared from public view.

Legal and Normative Concerns

Arms Transfer Law and Risk of Complicity

Australia is a party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which imposes a duty to refuse export permits where there is an “overriding risk” that the item would be used to commit war crimes or serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law. The direct transfer of F‑35 parts destined for Israel, amid credible findings of unlawful bombardment in Gaza, raises the question of whether those obligations have been breached.

If the components shipped from Australia enabled or sustained attacks in Gaza that violated humanitarian law, Australia may face legal exposure for complicity or aiding and abetting. Under the Articles on State Responsibility, a state may be held responsible if it “knowingly aids or assists” another in committing an internationally wrongful act.

Sovereign Oversight, Transparency, and Ministerial Accountability

The bypassing of parliamentary scrutiny and the pattern of denial point to severe lapses in transparency and ministerial accountability. In democracies, defence procurement and export decisions of this magnitude require rigorous oversight. The repeated denials in Parliament, now contradicted by leaks, suggest that public trust has been undermined.

Strategic and Geopolitical Implications

These revelations carry multiple strategic consequences:

• Australia’s claims of neutrality or distance from the conflict are no longer credible.

• Its alliances, especially with states that emphasize adherence to international law, may be strained.

• The integrity of the F‑35 global consortium is threatened if member states are found to be enabling war in breach of humanitarian norms.

• Domestically, political costs are likely to grow as public scrutiny intensifies.

A Crisis of Conscience and Credibility

Australia has long presented itself as a principled player on the world stage. Yet this quietly conducted pipeline of lethal components demonstrates a willingness to cede moral ground for purported strategic or industrial benefit. The exposed exports of F‑35 parts to Israel undercut Australia’s international standing, challenge its legal obligations, and demand urgent public accountability.

Australia must confront the implications of these disclosures rather than duck behind denials and obfuscation.

What Comes Next: Cease‑Fire, Peace Talks, and the Fate of Australia’s Dirty Secrets

If the cease‑fire between Israel and Hamas endures and eventually evolves into a negotiated peace settlement, several dynamics will emerge that have serious implications for Australia’s revealed role in supplying F‑35 parts. The persistence, scale, and moral weight of those revelations ensure that they cannot simply vanish from the public record. But political memory is notoriously short, and accountability is harder. Below are key trajectories and historical analogues that inform what is likely to happen.

1. The Tension Between Amnesia and Accountability

When conflicts wind down and peace becomes the dominant narrative, there is a strong impulse among states, media, and publics to “move on.” Past transgressions are downplayed, forgotten, or reinterpreted. The logic is simple: nations prefer to focus on rebuilding and reconciliation rather than digging up scandals that could fracture fragile accords.

For Australia, the exposed pipeline of F‑35 parts to Israel (if verified) could become a source of embarrassment. But whether it is remembered, punished, or institutionalized as a legal scandal depends on several variables:

• Civil society vigilance and media capacity: If investigative journalism, legal NGOs, and human rights advocates remain engaged, pressure can keep the issue alive.

• Political incentives: Successive governments may have reasons to bury the controversy, either to maintain defence industry relationships, protect foreign alliances, or avoid legal liability.

• Judicial and treaty mechanisms: If international courts, treaty bodies, or domestic oversight bodies initiate investigations, the claims may endure beyond political cycles.

In cases of prior controversy, many states have witnessed “issue fatigue,” where scandals fade from memory once political costs become too high. Accountability becomes the exception, not the rule.

2. Historical Precedents: When Dirty Deals Fade

There are several historical analogues in which states engaged in covert or morally suspect arms transfers or alliances, only to have those dealings recede into obscurity once peace diplomacy takes over.

• U.S.–Iran arms for hostages (1980s): The Iran–Contra affair in the United States involved prohibited arms sales in breach of congressional bans. The scandal rocked politics for a time, but over years the deeper systemic questions of oversight, accountability, and legal reform receded from public attention. Many involved individuals avoided full legal consequences, and much of the institutional change expected was never realized.

• France’s covert arms deals in Africa: In many post‑colonial peace processes, former colonial powers have quietly funded or armed one side in civil wars. Once peace treaties were brokered, these covert relationships were rarely prosecuted or publicly confronted; official narratives shift, cover stories are constructed, and many of the original documents remain suppressed.

• Turkey‑Israel military trade: Turkey for many years maintained secret military procurement exchanges with Israel, even while publicly criticizing Israeli operations. When relations cooled politically, the trade was downplayed, regulatory loopholes widened, and past complicity quietly receded from foreign policy debates.

These examples suggest that unless an issue is entrenched in legal or institutional reckoning, its memory is vulnerable.

3. The Legal and Moral Pressure Points That Might Persist

However, the revelations about F‑35 parts supply do present unique pressure points that may resist erasure:

• ICC and accessorial liability investigations: Earlier, a Sydney legal firm submitted a 92‑page “Article 15 communication” accusing Australian leaders of complicity in genocide. That submission was accepted into the ICC’s broader investigation of the situation in Palestine. If the ICC proceeds in its inquiry, evidence of arms supply- even indirectly - may be among the lines of inquiry that survive cease‑fire euphemisms.

• Domestic litigation, parliamentary inquiries, and Freedom of Information (FOI) recurrences: Opposition parties, civil society, or courts may resurrect the issue. FOI access might chip away at further redactions. Ministers who denied involvement may be called to answer in parliamentary inquiries.

• Public memory, academic scholarship, and media revision: The scandal may become part of Australia’s foreign policy lore. Future generations of researchers, journalists, and historians may unearth documents, keeping the matter in public consciousness.

• International reputation cost: If peace negotiations elevate accountability norms, Australia may find itself pressured by partners to clarify its role or face reputational and diplomatic costs.

4. Will Previous Indiscretions Be Forgotten?

Likely, many Australians and policymakers will prefer to forget, or claim ignorance of, the F‑35 parts pipeline. But that does not mean the revelations will disappear entirely. More likely is a layered outcome:

• Partial amnesia at the political level: Successive governments may choose to “close the chapter,” issue minimal statements, or reinterpret facts in more favourable light.

• Legal and historical persistence: The matter will linger in the archives, in investigative journalism, in law school case studies, and in civil society legal complaints.

• Selective accountability: Perhaps low‑level bureaucrats, export officials, or contractors might become scapegoats, while ministers and senior decision-makers quietly avoid full exposure.

• Institutional reforms disguised as closure: The government may adopt superficially tougher export controls or oversight measures ostensibly to “prevent recurrence” even as the underlying policy of supplying defence parts to allies continues under the guise of defence consortium arrangements.

In short: A cease‑fire may shift attention away from the scandal, but unless there is a forceful insistence on accountability, the stains will smudge and fade for many, but not all.

5. What Should Happen Instead

From an independent observer’s perspective, the moment of peace offers the best opportunity to demand clarity and accountability. If Australia is to maintain credibility in international law, the following steps should be pressed:

1. Publish all redacted shipping, permit, and ministerial documents related to F‑35 exports.

2. Convene a parliamentary commission of inquiry with full subpoena powers into defence export practices during the Gaza war period.

3. Amend the Defence Export Controls regime to ensure strict oversight on weapons components, not just weapons or ammunition.

4. Commit to international transparency: Provide auditing and reporting not just to domestic oversight bodies but to UN and treaty partners.

5. Engage civil society and victims: Allow affected communities and NGOs to submit evidence, testimonies, and scrutiny.

6. Cooperate with ICC or treaty bodies: If international investigations proceed, do not obstruct cooperation.

Conclusion

A durable cease‑fire and eventual peace in Gaza cannot by themselves erase the moral and legal reckoning that should follow. The revelations about Australia’s pipeline of F‑35 parts to Israel are not a footnote, they strike at the core of how arms trade, alliance loyalty, and accountability intersect.

If Australia fails to confront this openly, it risks repeating a familiar pattern: discreet complicity, selective memory, and a legal order that punishes the weak but protects the powerful. But if civil society, legal institutions, and public pressure demand transparency, those earlier wrongs may yet shape a more accountable future rather than putrefy in silence.