Australia presents itself as a transparent, rules based democracy with strong institutions and an ethical public sector. Yet beneath the surface lies a network of influence that blurs the boundary between national security policy making and those who profit from the manufacture of weapons. The relationship between government, the defence sector, media platforms and the global arms trade has evolved beyond traditional lobbying. It now incorporates sponsorships, revolving door appointments, advisory roles, and the shaping of public debate itself. The effect is subtle, often lawful, highly profitable, and corrosive to independent policy making.
A Quiet Capture of the Public Square
The National Press Club of Australia holds an iconic status in public life. Founded by journalists in 1963, it has long been considered one of the last remaining bastions of accountability, where political leaders, diplomats, academics and advocates are questioned in full public view. Yet this forum has become financially entwined with the very companies that shape Australia’s defence posture and lobby for defence spending.
The Club lists 81 corporate sponsors. Ten are multinational weapons manufacturers or military service corporations and another eleven provide services to arms companies, including KPMG, Accenture, Deloitte and EY. That means more than a quarter of the Club’s revenue is tied to the defence sector. In dollar terms, these 21 sponsors contribute approximately 525 thousand dollars a year, a significant portion of the Club’s 2.26 million dollars of sponsorship, membership and broadcasting revenue.
Those sponsors include Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, now known as RTX, the two largest weapons corporations in the world. They also include BAE Systems, France’s Thales, and the US based Leidos. In 2023, these five companies alone accounted for almost a quarter of the 973 billion dollars in weapons sales by the top 100 arms companies worldwide. BAE Systems is the single largest contractor to the Australian Defence Department and received 2 billion dollars from Australian taxpayers last year.
It is not simply the presence of these sponsors that raises questions. It is the context. UN experts warned last year that Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, RTX and others risk breaching international law for continuing to supply weapons and components to Israeli forces during the ongoing crisis in Gaza. The companies were urged to halt transfers to Israel. None did so. Thales, another Press Club sponsor, is under investigation in four countries for corruption. In South Africa a long running case alleges racketeering, fraud, corruption and money laundering involving Thales and former president Jacob Zuma.
These are the entities helping fund the premier platform for Australian political journalism.
When the Watchdog Takes Money from the Industry it Should Scrutinise
The Press Club asserts it partners only with organisations that share a commitment to independent journalism. There is no suggestion that any board member, sponsor or journalist has acted unlawfully. Yet the risk of structural bias is self evident. Sponsors enjoy privileged access at events, prominent seating, brand association, and a subtle but powerful proximity to those who set national security priorities.
The Sydney Morning Herald revealed that Westpac, the Club’s principal sponsor, once paid 3 million dollars for the privilege. At a major Press Club event last year, the bank’s chief executive sat between the Prime Minister and the Treasurer. Senior cabinet ministers filled the sponsor tables. Telstra, another major sponsor, also enjoys similar access. For companies with direct ties to defence procurement, or whose clients profit from defence contracts, such positioning is politically invaluable.
Sponsors are not officially granted speaking rights, but they are sometimes invited to address the Club. Their sponsorship status is not always disclosed to audiences. Meanwhile, invited speakers with strong defence ties are presented as objective commentators on national affairs.
Conflicts of Interest at the Board Level
The Club’s board is composed largely of journalists, but at least two board members work in roles that involve lobbying or advocacy. Long serving director Steve Lewis is a senior adviser at SEC Newgate, itself a Club sponsor. SEC Newgate has advised multiple defence related sponsors and represents the Club’s two largest sponsors, Westpac and Telstra. Another director, Gemma Daley, works for the Australian Industry Group, which promotes itself as the peak representative body for the defence industry. Its Defence Council is co chaired by senior arms industry executives. One of those co chairs is Paul Chase, CEO of Leidos Australia, also a Club sponsor.
These overlapping roles are not secret, nor necessarily improper, yet they demonstrate a culture in which advocacy for defence industry growth operates within the same institution that should scrutinise defence policy. The Club maintains a conflict of interest register and states that board members recuse themselves when needed. For a forum that prides itself on accountability, the public is expected to accept these assurances without transparency over the details.
Beyond Lobbying: A System of Influence
Defence corporations have long lobbied Australian government departments and ministers, registering meetings and using peak body associations such as the Australian Industry and Defence Network. What has evolved is a more sophisticated architecture of influence. It includes:
-
Revolving door appointments. Former defence officials regularly move into defence contracting roles, often within months of leaving public service. Former industry executives in turn join advisory committees and government working groups.
-
Consulting and audit firms as intermediaries. Four of the worlds largest audit and consulting firms are Press Club sponsors and have extensive defence consulting portfolios. EY audits Lockheed Martin and Thales, Deloitte audits BAE Systems, and PwC has long been the auditor for Raytheon. These firms facilitate export and import compliance, contract management, supply chain structuring and political engagement strategies.
-
Embedding in public institutions. Sponsorship of the Press Club is only one example. Defence companies fund think tanks, education programs, scholarships, exhibitions and community events that align them with national security narratives.
The result is a political and cultural environment in which expanding defence capability becomes framed not only as necessary, but inevitable and virtuous, while critical examination of procurement, ethical responsibility and civilian harm is muted.
Australia’s Exposure to Global Impunity
UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese has described the profits made through arms sales to Israel during the Gaza crisis as corporate complicity in genocide. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and BAE Systems provide weapons and components central to Israel’s campaigns. Thales supplies critical drone technology. Australia sits within the F35 supply chain, with more than 75 Australian companies contributing.
While France claims its exports to Israel are non lethal, Thales produced the transponders used in the drone that killed Australian aid worker Zomi Frankcom and her colleagues with World Central Kitchen. The Australian Government responded with diplomatic language rather than sanctions or withdrawal of defence cooperation.
When corporations under such scrutiny hold sponsorships of national media forums and maintain influence over government contractors, the guardrails of accountability weaken.
The Democratic Cost
There is no need for illegal conduct to erode public trust or policy integrity. When the same companies that profit from war and conflict are intertwined with political communication channels, policy making forums and advisory networks, the threshold for undue influence lowers.
Arms industry expert Andrew Feinstein has shown that wherever the global arms trade operates, corruption risk rises and democratic accountability falls. The secrecy inherent in defence procurement, paired with the financial magnitude of contracts, creates fertile ground for influence without transparency.
Australia is entering a period of major defence expansion, including submarine acquisition, missile capability, artificial intelligence driven warfare and expanded domestic manufacturing. Decisions taken now will shape the nation for decades.
A public conversation dominated by institutions funded by defence contractors cannot claim independence.
Rebuilding Independence
Australia requires more than compliance with lobbying registers. It needs structural separation between media forums and industries they should question, transparency on sponsorship arrangements, post employment restrictions for defence officials, and truly independent oversight of defence procurement and foreign military collaboration.
The credibility of Australian democracy rests not on avoiding wrongdoing, but on avoiding the conditions that allow it to take root. A nation that allows weapons manufacturers to finance the platforms of political journalism risks losing the one thing more valuable than any defence contract. That is a genuinely informed public.
Addendum: Integrity Under Strain in Oversight of Defence Accountability
Recent events have intensified concerns about the integrity of Australia’s corruption oversight framework in relation to Defence. The head of the National Anti Corruption Commission (NACC), Paul Brereton, has withdrawn from involvement in any corruption matters that touch on the Australian Defence Force or Defence Department. The move followed mounting scrutiny of his ongoing links to the military and the perceived impact of those ties on his impartiality.
The announcement was released quietly late on a Friday, a tactic often used within government to minimise immediate public attention. It came after questions surfaced regarding the Commissioner’s continued Defence connections, including his extended service in the Army Reserve. Brereton had twice been granted permission to remain in the Reserve past the normal retirement age to provide high level advice to ministers and senior officials during the Afghanistan war crimes inquiry. This remained in place despite previous assurances that he had severed formal ties.
Further unease grew when it emerged that after becoming the head of the NACC, Brereton had provided advice on multiple occasions to the Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force, the very body that examines the conduct of Defence personnel. Evidence to Senate Estimates revealed that both the NACC’s Chief Executive and NACC’s Inspector had been unaware of the consultancy work. The oversight body later confirmed it had sought further information about the arrangement.
Although the Commission stated that Brereton had acted within conflict management rules, it conceded that the focus on his Defence connections had become a distraction from the organisation’s core work. As a result, all Defence related referrals will now be assigned to a Deputy Commissioner. The NACC insisted this was not a requirement for proper conflict management, rather a measure to restore confidence in its operations.
The episode has sharpened public concern about transparency. The Greens spokesperson for both Justice and Defence, David Shoebridge, criticised the timing and low profile nature of the announcement, suggesting it was an attempt to bury uncomfortable information. He argued that serious questions remain unanswered about the Commissioner’s Defence engagements and the oversight of those arrangements.
This incident follows an earlier finding by the NACC’s Inspector that Brereton had engaged in unintentional officer misconduct in a separate matter dealing with a conflict issue related to a Robodebt referral. That ruling had already placed the Commission under a spotlight regarding its own standards.
For a body tasked with safeguarding integrity in public institutions, the perception of impartiality is as vital as the reality. Defence contracting and military associated procurement remain among the most sensitive areas of government spending, and public confidence in the NACC’s independence is fundamental. Brereton’s recusal from Defence matters may ease immediate tension, but the circumstances behind it raise a deeper question about whether Australia’s integrity mechanisms are robust enough to withstand the powerful gravitational pull of the Defence establishment.
Comments
Post a Comment