Critical Minerals, Geoeconomic Competition and the Political Economy of Militarism: Implications for the United States and Australia

Abstract

This article examines the structural relationship between United States critical minerals policy and the material requirements of the defence industrial base, and then extends the analysis to Australia as a pivotal upstream supplier within allied supply chains. Drawing on US Geological Survey data, International Energy Agency market reviews, Department of Defense strategy documents, Australian Electoral Commission disclosures and publicly reported polling data through early 2026, it argues that mineral securitisation is not simply about supply chain resilience. It is embedded in the expansion of advanced weapons production and is reshaping domestic political economies in resource rich allied states, including Australia.

1. The Material Foundations of Military Power

Advanced weapons systems are mineral intensive. Rare earth elements such as neodymium, dysprosium and samarium are essential for high performance permanent magnets used in precision guided munitions, electric motors, radar systems and aircraft actuators. The US Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 identifies rare earth magnets as critical inputs to defence applications.

The US Government Accountability Office has previously documented that F 35 aircraft contain substantial quantities of rare earth materials embedded in magnets, electronics and targeting systems. Lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite underpin battery systems used in drones, communications equipment and space platforms. Gallium and germanium are used in advanced semiconductors for radar and missile guidance systems.

Modern military superiority is therefore materially dependent on secure access to processed critical minerals.

2. Concentration of Processing Capacity

According to the International Energy Agency Critical Minerals Market Review and USGS data, China accounts for roughly two thirds of global rare earth mining output and more than 80 percent of global rare earth refining capacity. For certain heavy rare earth elements, refining dominance exceeds 90 percent.

China has demonstrated its capacity to leverage this position. In 2010 it restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a maritime dispute. In 2023 and 2025 it imposed export controls on gallium, germanium and certain graphite products. These actions revealed the vulnerability of downstream industries in the United States and Europe.

From a strategic perspective, refining concentration translates into geopolitical leverage over advanced manufacturing and weapons production.

3. US Mineral Securitisation

Successive US administrations have designated critical minerals as a national security priority. Executive Order 13817 under President Trump identified 35 critical minerals. The Biden administration expanded federal funding under the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for domestic processing and battery supply chains.

The Department of Defense has used the Defense Production Act to fund rare earth separation facilities in Texas and California. The State Department launched the Minerals Security Partnership in 2022 to coordinate allied supply chain diversification. The US Export Import Bank and Department of Energy have provided financing and loan guarantees for projects tied to lithium extraction and rare earth processing.

Public policy framing emphasises supply chain resilience and reduced dependence on China. However, these measures coincide with rapid expansion of the US defence industrial base.

4. Expansion of the Defence Industrial Base

The United States Department of Defense budget for Fiscal Year 2025 exceeded 880 billion US dollars according to Congressional Budget Office projections. Supplemental appropriations related to Ukraine, Israel and Indo Pacific force posture adjustments further increase total outlays.

Major contractors such as Lockheed Martin, RTX Corporation and Northrop Grumman reported record order backlogs in 2024 and 2025. Lockheed Martin’s 2024 annual report lists a backlog exceeding 160 billion US dollars.

Weapons production is mineral intensive. Neodymium magnets enable missile guidance. Samarium cobalt magnets operate in high temperature jet engines. Gallium arsenide semiconductors underpin radar arrays. Lithium ion batteries power autonomous systems.

As procurement scales upward, mineral demand rises proportionally. Securing mineral inputs reduces supply uncertainty and protects contractor production schedules and margins.

5. Geoeconomic Competition and Strategic Chokepoints

US diplomatic engagement has increasingly targeted mineral rich jurisdictions such as Greenland and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, alongside efforts to secure maritime chokepoints such as the Panama Canal. The USGS 2025 data show that the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for approximately 70 percent of global cobalt production.

Control of transit routes also matters. The Panama Canal Authority reports that roughly 40 percent of US container trade transits the canal, which also enables rapid naval movement between oceans.

Mineral diplomacy and infrastructure alignment are therefore part of a broader strategy to prevent strategic vetoes over defence industrial inputs.

6. Australia’s Structural Position in Allied Mineral Strategy

Australia is one of the world’s leading producers of lithium and a major supplier of nickel and other critical minerals. The US Geological Survey identifies Australia as a top global lithium producer.

Australian policy has increasingly aligned with allied supply chain diversification. Canberra has established financing mechanisms such as the Critical Minerals Facility and promoted investment in upstream and midstream processing projects to integrate Australian output into US and allied industrial ecosystems.

This alignment embeds Australia more deeply into the material foundations of US and allied military production. Upstream extraction in Western Australia and other regions becomes part of a strategic supply architecture aimed at reducing Chinese leverage over refining and processing.

7. Mining Oligarchs and Capital Positioning

Australia’s major mining oligarchs occupy a pivotal position in this restructuring.

Gina Rinehart’s Hancock Prospecting has publicly reported stakes in rare earth and critical mineral ventures, including positions linked to Lynas Rare Earths and US rare earth producer MP Materials. Public reporting by industry media documents these investments as part of a strategic push into rare earth supply chains.

Australian Electoral Commission donor returns for 2024 to 2025 show Hancock Prospecting declaring 204,000 Australian dollars in donations to political parties and 895,000 Australian dollars to significant third parties. The Minerals Council of Australia reported donations exceeding 1 million Australian dollars in the same reporting period.

These figures are drawn from the AEC transparency database and represent declared amounts above disclosure thresholds. The timing of disclosures means that the most recent months of the electoral cycle may not yet be fully visible in public data.

Such financial flows matter because mineral securitisation policy increases the value of upstream assets. Public underwriting of strategic projects, accelerated approvals and diplomatic backing for allied supply chain integration directly benefit firms controlling extraction assets.

8. Political Realignment and the Surge of One Nation

Polling analysis published in February 2026 by ABC and other outlets reports One Nation’s primary vote above 20 percent nationally in certain surveys, with significant increases in regional and resource intensive electorates.

This political surge intersects with mineral geopolitics in several ways. Resource nationalism framed as economic sovereignty resonates in mining regions experiencing cost of living pressures. Expanded extraction and deregulation can be positioned as job protection and national strength.

For oligarchic capital, securitised mineral policy delivers strategic rents and public support. For populist politics, it offers a narrative of sovereignty and industrial revival. The convergence of these interests risks entrenching an extractive political economy tied explicitly to alliance driven rearmament.

9. Structural Feedback Loop

The interaction between US militarism and Australian mineral capitalism can be conceptualised as a feedback loop:

1. Geopolitical rivalry justifies expanded defence procurement.

2. Defence expansion increases demand for critical minerals.

3. Mineral scarcity narratives justify public underwriting and geoeconomic intervention.

4. Upstream suppliers and defence contractors benefit from stabilised demand and reduced supply risk.

5. Political financing and populist mobilisation reinforce policies favouring extraction and militarisation.

This loop is structural rather than conspiratorial. It reflects material interdependence between industrial capacity, resource control and political power.

Conclusion

Critical minerals are not peripheral commodities. They are foundational inputs to advanced weapons systems and digital military infrastructure.

US efforts to secure supply chains reflect genuine strategic vulnerability arising from Chinese refining dominance. Yet these policies also stabilise and expand the profitability of the defence industrial base.

Australia, as a major upstream supplier, is increasingly integrated into this architecture. Mining oligarchs benefit from securitised mineral policy and publicly supported integration into allied defence supply chains. Political realignment, including the rise of One Nation, adds a populist dimension that may further entrench extractive expansion under the banner of sovereignty.

The result is a deepening fusion of geoeconomic competition, resource extraction and militarised industrial policy. In this configuration, mineral strategy functions not merely as resilience planning but as a central pillar sustaining the material and financial foundations of contemporary militarism.