Australia has spent three years being told that the AUKUS submarine plan is irreversible. Contracts have been signed, workers recruited, legislation passed and billions committed. American submarines are preparing to rotate through Western Australia. Construction is beginning at Osborne. A new nuclear regulator and submarine agency have been created.
The political message is plain: whatever doubts remain, the country has travelled too far to turn back.
It is also dangerously misleading.
Australia has not yet received a Virginia-class submarine. It has not begun assembling an SSN-AUKUS. The British reactor intended to power that submarine has not gone to sea. The final Australian submarine design has not been completed. The industrial facilities required to construct, maintain and regulate the fleet are not finished. The most expensive, technically hazardous and politically binding stages still lie ahead.
That means it is not too late to change course.
But it may soon be too late to change course cheaply, coherently or without confronting the United States.
The plan is becoming irreversible before it becomes credible
AUKUS is often presented as a submarine acquisition program. Increasingly, it looks like something broader: the construction of a permanent American submarine operating system on Australian territory.
From 2027, HMAS Stirling is expected to host the rotational presence of up to four American Virginia-class submarines and one British submarine. Australia describes those vessels as conventionally armed and insists that they will remain under their countries’ command. The official purpose is to prepare Australian personnel and infrastructure for the eventual operation of Australia’s own nuclear-powered fleet. (Defence)
Until last week, the government had left the duration of this arrangement conveniently indistinct.
On 29 July, defence industry minister Pat Conroy told the ABC that Submarine Rotational Force-West was due to end in the early 2030s. He specified 2032 and linked its conclusion to Australia receiving its first Virginia-class submarine. The ABC reasonably reported that the minister had placed a five-year limit on the American rotation. (ABC News)
Two days later, defence minister Richard Marles contradicted him.
Marles said the rotation was intended to be an “enduring feature” of the American force posture in Australia. Asked directly whether Conroy had been wrong, Marles declined to say so. Instead, he asserted that Conroy had issued a statement consistent with the enduring-presence formulation and claimed this had been the government’s position from the outset. (minister.defence.gov.au)
Both propositions cannot sensibly describe the same arrangement. A force that finishes in 2032 is not enduring. An enduring American force posture does not end after five years.
This was not an academic misunderstanding about terminology. Conroy’s statement came while he was being questioned about the future possibility of American attack submarines carrying nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. By saying the rotation would end in 2032, he appeared to reassure Australians that this question might never arise at Stirling. The subsequent correction removed that reassurance without resolving the underlying issue.
The confusion exposed something larger. Australian ministers appear unable, or unwilling, to provide a clear public account of what has actually been agreed with Washington.
Temporary submarines, permanent infrastructure
The physical evidence points towards endurance.
The US Navy has re-established Submarine Squadron 3 to support operations from HMAS Stirling. Its mission is not confined to training Australians. The US Navy says the squadron will allow its submarines and crews to respond rapidly in support of American regional deterrence objectives.
Naval Support Activity Stirling is being established to provide logistical and administrative support for US military personnel, civilian employees, contractors and families. A Pearl Harbor naval shipyard detachment is preparing to manage intermediate-level submarine maintenance. Australia is building berths, maintenance facilities, security systems, accommodation and supporting infrastructure around this presence.
These are not the features of an occasional port visit. They are the institutional architecture of a forward operating location.
The distinction between a “base” and a “rotation” is becoming semantic. The submarines may rotate. The command structure, workshops, contractors, security arrangements, supply chains and strategic purpose remain.
That distinction matters because infrastructure creates dependency before any formal decision about permanence is made. Once thousands of Australian jobs, defence contracts and operational plans rely on the American presence, asking the United States to leave will become politically and economically far more difficult. By then, Canberra may technically retain the right to change course while having lost the practical capacity to exercise it.
America is not building spare submarines for Australia
The central promise of AUKUS remains that Australia will acquire at least three Virginia-class submarines beginning in the early 2030s.
Those transfers are not guaranteed. Under American law, a future US president must certify that selling a submarine to Australia will not reduce the United States’ own undersea capability. That decision will be made in the strategic and industrial circumstances prevailing at the time, not according to promises made in Canberra a decade earlier.
Those circumstances are becoming more demanding.
The US Navy’s May 2026 shipbuilding plan calls for two Virginia-class submarines in FY2027 and 10 across the five-year period to FY2031. Six would be Block VI boats and four Block VII. The stated objective is to reach production of at least two Virginias and one Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine each year by FY2031. The Navy describes stabilising the supply chain and expanding the skilled workforce as its leading industrial priorities.
This is sometimes portrayed as reassuring evidence that American production is recovering. In reality, it reveals how much work remains.
The United States is not simply replacing ageing Los Angeles-class submarines. It is trying to enlarge and modernise its own attack-submarine force, build the Columbia ballistic-missile fleet, develop later Virginia blocks and design the future SSN(X). Its industrial system must satisfy all those requirements before any future administration decides that submarines can safely be released to Australia.
The widely circulated claim that Washington has just ordered a new 10,000-ton class of attack submarine does not withstand scrutiny. No official contract matching that description could be identified, and the reported dimensions and Virginia Payload Module point instead to later Virginia-class variants. The official plan says SSN(X) will not begin construction until the early 2040s. (National Security)
Yet the strategic implication remains serious. Washington intends to retain a large, increasingly heavily armed attack-submarine fleet. A Block V or later Virginia displaces about 10,000 tonnes because the payload module adds four large-diameter tubes and substantially expands its capacity to carry Tomahawk missiles and other payloads.
These are among America’s most valuable naval assets. They are not surplus inventory waiting to be exported. They are central to US planning for high-intensity war in the western Pacific.
Australia’s submarine entitlement therefore competes with America’s own operational plans. The more acute the perceived threat from China becomes, the less politically attractive it may be for Washington to remove boats from the US fleet.
The rotation may be the substitute, not the bridge
This changes how the Stirling presence should be understood.
The government says American submarines will rotate through Western Australia while Australia becomes “sovereign ready”. But if no Virginia is available for transfer in 2032, the American rotation offers Washington and Canberra a ready-made substitute.
The United States still gains a forward submarine hub on the Indian Ocean side of Australia. Its vessels obtain maintenance, logistics and shorter access to operating areas. Australian workers help relieve pressure on American shipyards. Washington increases the geographic resilience of its submarine force.
Canberra, meanwhile, can point to allied submarines operating from Australia and claim that the region is being deterred, even though Australia has not acquired an independent capability.
Under that scenario, the bridge becomes the destination.
Australia could spend billions preparing Stirling for US submarines, billions assisting the American industrial base and billions constructing nuclear infrastructure, only to discover that the boats actually operating from Australian territory remain American.
The government’s contradictory statements make this concern more credible, not less. If the rotation is enduring, it cannot logically depend upon Australia’s Virginia delivery schedule. It has an independent strategic purpose for the United States.
So, is it too late?
There are three different questions concealed within that phrase.
Is it legally too late? No. AUKUS is not an irrevocable treaty requiring Australia to purchase a fixed number of submarines. The submarine pathway rests on political commitments, legislation, contracts and bilateral arrangements, all of which can be reviewed, renegotiated or terminated, although doing so may incur substantial costs.
Is it financially painless to withdraw? Certainly not. Australia has already committed billions to domestic infrastructure, American shipbuilding and workforce development. Some expenditure would be lost, while some facilities and skills could be redirected to other defence purposes. The relevant comparison, however, is not between withdrawal and recovering every dollar already spent. It is between stopping now and committing hundreds of billions more to a pathway that may never produce the promised fleet.
Money already spent is not evidence that more should follow. That is the sunk-cost fallacy dressed as strategic resolve.
Is it strategically possible to change course without creating a submarine gap? That is the difficult question, and critics should not pretend otherwise.
The Collins-class fleet is ageing. Its life-of-type extension is already demanding. A new conventional submarine would require selection, design work, contracts, construction and crews. A French nuclear option would involve complex negotiations over reactor technology, fuel, maintenance, weapons, safeguards and intellectual property. France has not publicly offered Australia an off-the-shelf Suffren-class fleet, and no substitute could be delivered instantly.
Changing course would carry risk.
But continuing carries risk on a much greater financial scale, with the additional danger that Australia loses control over both the capability and the strategic decisions it is intended to support.
A review should not begin with another predetermined answer
The sensible alternative is not to cancel AUKUS one morning and order French submarines that afternoon.
Australia should pause new irreversible Pillar 1 commitments and conduct an independent, publicly accountable review of the entire undersea capability.
That review should assess the probability of Virginia transfers under America’s latest shipbuilding plan, not under the diplomatic assumptions of 2023. It should examine whether the proposed Australian workforce can simultaneously extend Collins, maintain Virginias, build SSN-AUKUS submarines and support American boats.
It should compare the AUKUS highly enriched uranium pathway with low-enriched uranium alternatives, including French technology, while correcting exaggerated claims about both. Low-enriched fuel would reduce proliferation sensitivity, but it would not eliminate nuclear regulation, refuelling, radioactive waste, physical security or dependence on a foreign reactor supplier.
It should also examine long-range conventional submarines as either an enduring capability or an interim measure. That assessment must be based on Australian transit distances, endurance, weapons, battery technology, maintainability and delivery schedules rather than the political need to vindicate a previous French contract or punish its cancellation.
Most importantly, the review should separate two objectives that the government habitually conflates.
One is acquiring an Australian-controlled submarine force.
The other is supporting American submarine operations from Australia.
AUKUS may deliver the second even if it fails to deliver the first.
Sovereignty cannot be inferred from ownership
The government insists Australia will retain sovereignty because Australian submarines will be Australian-owned and because foreign forces require Australian knowledge and concurrence.
That is an incomplete definition.
A submarine is not sovereign merely because Australia owns the hull. Operational independence also depends on access to weapons, software, intelligence, communications, technical data, spare parts, reactor support and maintenance capacity.
A fleet assembled from American submarines and British-designed replacements would depend on two overseas industrial systems, both already under pressure. The proposed mixed fleet would introduce different designs, supply chains, training requirements and maintenance systems into a very small force.
The Stirling arrangements deepen that dependence. Australian infrastructure and personnel are being integrated into an American operational network before Australia has obtained a single submarine of its own.
This does not mean every Australian operation would be dictated from Washington. It means the cost of disagreeing with Washington may become so high that nominal freedom of decision loses much of its practical meaning.
The remaining window
Australia still has a window in which much of the expertise, infrastructure and money committed to AUKUS could be redirected.
Nuclear safety expertise would remain valuable. Modern graving docks could support conventional submarines and surface ships. Expanded shipbuilding facilities could be used for frigates, landing vessels, autonomous systems and other naval capabilities. Workers trained in advanced manufacturing would not suddenly become useless.
But that flexibility will diminish as specialised facilities are completed, American forces become entrenched, contracts multiply and Australia’s future fleet is designed around access to American and British systems.
The moment of maximum political embarrassment may also be the moment of minimum strategic damage.
A government that pauses AUKUS now would be accused of wasting money, offending allies and weakening deterrence. A government forced to confront its failure in 2032 may face all those accusations after spending vastly more, while the Collins fleet approaches retirement and the American submarine presence has become indispensable.
That is why the question is not whether changing course is cost-free. It is whether Australia still possesses enough freedom to compare the cost of departure with the cost of staying.
It does, for now.
But the most durable component of AUKUS is no longer the promised Australian submarine. It is the American military system already being constructed around HMAS Stirling.
Unless Australia subjects the program to an independent review before that system hardens, the country may discover that AUKUS became irreversible not when its first submarine arrived, but when Australian governments ceased to believe they could ask the Americans to leave.
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